CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 19 March 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. YIFRU

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de SAN THIAGO DANTAS

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. C.A. BERNARDES

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LOUCANOV

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. V. PALINE

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Burma:

U Thi HAN

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. H. GREEN

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. DAVID

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Mr. K. YIFRU

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

Mr. M. HAMID

India:

Mr. V.K. KRISHNA MENON

Mr. M.J. DESAI

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. C. RUSSO

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAGIATI

Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO.

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. J. WACHUKTI

Mr. A.A. ATTA

Mr. A. HAASTRUP

Mr. V.N. CHIBUNDU

Poland:

Mr. A. RAPACKI

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. M. BIEN

Mr. T. WISNIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. MANESCU

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. C. SANDRU

Mr. M. MALITZA

Sweden:

Mr. O. UNDEN

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. G.A. WESTRING

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. GROMYKO

Mr. V.A. ZORIN

Mr. V.P. SUSLOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. FAWZI

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. TALAAT

Mr. M.S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK

Mr. R. RIDDELL

United States of America:

Mr. D. RUSK

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputies to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. T.G. NARAYANAN

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I have two speakers on the list for today: the representative of Bulgaria and the representative of Canada.

Mr. LOUCANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian):

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament which was set up to work out and propose an agreement on general and complete disarmament has begun its work in a complicated international situation. Nevertheless, there are a number of circumstances that are favourable to the Committee's work. First of all, there is the fact that the idea of general and complete disarmament has taken hold of masses of people in all countries in the world. It has also been accepted by all the representatives of the member States of the United Nations. The peoples have never wanted wars, except in cases where they were forced to take up arms in the struggle to win their national independence or to defend it. This cannot be said of those groups for whom the militarization of the economy is profitable, who have the apparatus of production at their disposal and obtain from military orders the greatest profits with a guaranteed sale.

I would remind you that until quite recently, apparently serious people maintained that war is rooted in the nature of man and human society and that, therefore, it is virtually pointless and naïve to speak of, and even more so to strive for general and complete disarmament. There were also those who asserted that wars can be waged, if not with modern types of weapons, then with primitive means — cudgels, stones and knives. Such naïve talk, or rather ill—intentioned propaganda of the enemies of disarmament is no longer heard today, and the peoples' demand for the elimination of the physical possibilities of waging war is apparently recognized by everyone.

The favourable conditions in which our Committee is beginning its work, include the principles for an agreement on general and complete disarmament adopted as a result of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States and subsequently approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Another positive fact is that not only all the continents but all the main groups of States existing in the world today are represented on our Committee.

Justice demands that it should be noted that all this is a result of the relentless struggle carried on for many years by the socialist States and peace-loving forces against war, against the use of war as a means of solving international disputes.

Justice demands that it should be particularly emphasized that the favourable circumstances for the present examination of the greatest problem of our times, the problem of general and complete disarmament, were created by the proposals of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, which were put forward a little over two years ago and are winning more and more new adherents every day.

We cannot, however, pretend that we do not notice how serious are the difficulties standing in the way of general and complete disarmament as soon as the search for a practical approach to this problem begins. This was already felt in the first days of the work of our Conference.

In what situation do we find ourselves today? The resolution of 20 December 1961 of the General Assembly of the United Nations placed before all Governments a very clear task, namely, not to spare any efforts in preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. What could be more natural than that we should sit at the conference table and work out paragraph by paragraph a draft treaty on disarmament? That is how this question is approached by the Soviet Government, which has submitted to us a comprehensive and lucid treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has instructed me to state that my country fully supports this draft treaty and considers it the soundest basis for the further work of the Committee.

The component parts of international treaties are well-known. There is, first, This is followed by an enumeration of the tasks to a definition of the agreement. Thirdly, there is a statement of the be carried out in order to achieve that aim. obligations of the contracting parties and the time-limits within which these obligations are to be discharged. And, finally, the methods of verifying the implementation of the treaty are specified as are the sanctions to be applied in the event of possible violations of its provisions. All these components are unquestionably to be found in the Soviet draft Treaty. Having regard to the complexity and urgency of the task, the Soviet Government's draft Treaty, while providing for its fulfilment in gradual stages, also contains measures to preclude the outbreak of the most dangerous of all military conflicts - a nuclear missile

conflict - as speedily as possible. The Soviet draft Treaty further lays down a time limit for the creation of a world without weapons, on the expiry of which all mankind will be able to devote itself to peaceful constructive work with a view to satisfying all the material and spiritual needs of human society as fully as possible.

The first stage provided for in the Soviet draft Treaty is of exceptional importance. The elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the dismantling of military bases situated in the territory of other States virtually rules out the use of nuclear weapons. This alters the whole international atmosphere in favour of peace and practically eliminates the possibility of a sudden, unexpected nuclear missile attack.

In the Soviet Union's draft treaty the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons is quite naturally linked with the simultaneous dismantling of foreign The existing military bases of certain Wester Powers and blocs like military bases. NATO have, in effect, been moved up in advance to the front line, to the frontiers of the socialist States, as a result of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, i.e. as a result of the preliminary delivery of these weapons. Unless this means of delivery is eliminated, it will be impossible to consider or claim that all means of delivering nuclear weapons have been eliminated. With the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the dismantling of military bases, these weapons of mass destruction will already have lost their aggressive character in the first stage. They are, moreover, to be destroyed in the second stage, i.e. within some three years of the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. There is no need of proof that, under this procedure, no country or group of countries would obtain any advantage over another country or group of countries.

It seems to us that the last people one would have expected to raise objections to such a draft are the representatives of the United States, whose President supported, at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the general view that weapons must be destroyed in order to prevent them from destroying mankind.

Recently, during discussions of the Soviet proposals on general and complete, disarmament, some Western representatives regularly took the line that the control provided for in these proposals was inadequate. The Soviet draft Treaty now before us deals fully with the problems of control over disarmament, co-ordinating such control with the relevant disarmament measures at each stage.

We cannot accept the view that control should be exercised, not over the armaments that are being destroyed, but over those that remain. At present there is no form of control over armaments in the world at all. It cannot seriously be maintained that such a state of affairs is preferable to the situation that would come into being after the implementation of the measures provided for in the first stage of the Soviet draft in other words, after eighteen months, not to mention the one that would come into being after the completion of the second stage, or after approximately three years. Other positive features of the Soviet proposals relating to control are the fact that they clearly define what is to be controlled and that, from the standpoint of ensuring complete control, they safeguard disarmament and do not encourage bad intentions. After all, the four-year period proposed by the Soviet Union for the destruction of all types of weapon and the disbanding of all armed forces through the gradual and controlled liquidation of whole categories and types of armaments and armed forces represents but a brief moment in the history of mankind, and thereafter the door will remain wide open for all time for anyone to exercise any form of control in any country and in any part of any country. It should also be pointed out that the confidence or lack of confidence among nations of which there is so much talk is not created and cannot be eliminated overnight. It is precisely from the point of view of international peace and confidence that the Soviet draft Treaty offers the most satisfactory solution.

We realize, of course, that the implementation of general and complete disarmament in a period of four years would preclude such phenomena of international life as armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, which has become a habit with, and is natural to, some colonial Powers and imperialistic circles, but this will not be any loss to the peoples and mankind as a whole. The time has finally come to do away with sabotage and resistance to disarmament on the part not only of these who profit from armaments, but also of those who like to impose their will on other peoples and to dictate to them the kind of social and political regime they should or should not have.

I shall not attempt to analyze in any detail the provisions which are known to us as the "Programme for General and Complete Disarmament" of the United States Government, but I should like to mention briefly certain questions to which these provisions give rise. In the first place, they propose a cut of 30 per cent in nuclear delivery vehicles to be carried out in three years. It may be asked why three

years are needed for the implementation of such measures and, in that event, whether we could not tell the peoples of the world here and now how many years it will be before all means of delivery of nuclear weapons have disappeared, in other words, how long it will be before all means of delivery of nuclear weapons have been completely destroyed, after which the production of such weapons will cease and existing stocks will be destroyed. There is another question to which we must seek to obtain a clear-cut answer: would not the remaining 70 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles be sufficient to inflict considerable injury on mankind, having regard to the assertions by a number of experts that the nuclear weapons at present in existence are fully sufficient to destroy more than one world? We should also try to answer the question of why the proposal for a cut of 30 per cent in nuclear delivery vehicles should not be linked with the question of returning to the territory of the States to which they belong nuclear weapons already delivered to areas near the boundaries of socialist countries, i.e., with the question of the dismantling of the numerous military bases near the frontiers of socialist countries. And, finally, we must determine when the era of general and complete disarmament is to begin, in other words, when an armed world bristling with explosives will become a thing of the past and make way for a stable and inviolable peace on earth.

We have not raised these questions out of any desire to engage in polemics - at least not at the present stage of the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee - but because we must be clear, in principle, from the outset on the practical results we are endeavouring to achieve by meeting here and on the basic principles on which our work is to rest. For the purpose of reaching agreement on those basic principles, it would have been wise to have accepted the Soviet proposal that the Committee should start its work at the highest level. When the Western Powers countered the Soviet suggestion with the proposal that the Committee should meet at the Foreign Minister level, at the same time asserting that the most highly placed leaders in their countries felt a personal responsibility for the work of our Committee, the intention presumably was precisely that the basic principles governing our work should be determined and agreed upon during the first few days of the Conference. For our part we repeat, we consider that these principles should be:

first, that a treaty on general and complete disarmament should be drawn up as speedily as possible, notwithstanding the fact that many questions remain outstanding in the world, some of which are extremely important,

and, secondly, that ways and means should be explored of improving the international atmosphere by adopting separate measures and concluding separate agreements before the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Precisely because there are unsettled international questions, the solution of which by means of war must be avoided in order to prevent a war from developing into a worldwide nuclear missile conflict, it is essential to reach agreement and essential to adopt a realistic approach to general and complete disarmament.

Linking the existence of "crises" in international relations with the questions of general and complete disarmament means remaining on the old positions and continuing to regard the peaceful settlement of disputes as impossible. The truth, however, is that there are no international disputes which could not be settled by peaceful means.

With regard to preliminary measures aimed at reducing international tension, the Bulgarian Government agrees with and supports the proposals put forward by the Soviet side, just as it will also support any other constructive proposal in this direction. In the first place, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests can be settled immediately by the great Powers possessing these weapons. It has already been proved that no test, no explosion of a nuclear weapon, including no underground test, remains undetected. Thus it is proved that the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is a question of goodwill and not of international control on the territories of other States, which is unnecessary, since all this can be carried out by the national systems of a number of countries. In these circumstances the peoples are entitled to expect signs of goodwill on the part of those who, on the eve of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, announced a forthcoming series of further nuclear tests.

With regard to preliminary measures for preserving peace throughout the world, we particularly wish to stress the desirability of concluding a non-aggression pact between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and the States belong to NATO, the need to do away as quickly as possible with the vestiges of the second world war, and also the creation of zones free from atomic and missile weapons.

The Bulgarian delegation supported the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the conversion of Africa into a denuclearized zone. The People's Republic of Bulgaria warmly supports the Polish Government's proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. Our country consistently supports the proposal for the creation of a zone free from nuclear and missile weapons in the Balkans and in the Adriatic region and is doing its utmost to have this proposal carried out.

In the course of the work of the Committee the Bulgarian delegation will have occasion to consider all the questions raised and to express its views on them in greater detail. At present we should like to draw particular attention to the fact that the Committee has before it only one draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, a realistic draft treaty which satisfies all advocates of general and complete disarmament, namely, the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government. To examine this draft treaty with a view to its becoming the draft treaty of the whole of our Committee is the shortest way to accomplish the task entrusted to us. The position of the Bulgarian Government on the question of general and complete disarmament was once again expounded with the utmost clarity, in connexion with the recent parliamentary elections in our country, in the policy statement of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Jhivkov. He said in his speech:

"For us, for our country ... general and complete disarmament is the key problem of international relations. We - mankind - will remove the danger of a new nuclear missile war, only if we bring about general and complete disarmament ... On 14 March, negotiations are to be resumed in the Committee on Disarmament on a broader basis. The People's Republic of Bulgaria as a member of the Committee ... will make sincere and steadfast efforts to achieve progress in solving this question which is of vital importance to all peoples".

I can assure the delegates representing the member countries of the Eighteen Nation Committee that the Bulgarian delegation will take an active part in examining and adopting in the first place the basic document which has to be prepared, namely, a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and that it will be prepared to consider, side by side with the solution of the basic problem, also separate measures for the prevention of a new world war, which have been or may be submitted to the attention of our Committee.

Mr. GREEN (Canada): I begin my statement today on behalf of Canada by thanking the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations for the excellent facilities which have been made available. The presence of his representative at this table is of great significance. It emphasizes that all Members of the United Nations are vitally concerned with the problem of disarmament. In my opinion we

should never lose sight of this fact in the course of our negotiations. It is obvious that the main purpose of the United Nations is to keep the peace. Of course, under present conditions that means that disarmament becomes the most important problem of the United Nations, and that forum will always have the main responsibility for bringing about disarmament.

There are several reasons why this Conference has an unprecedented opportunity to make rapid progress toward agreement.

First, there is now an agreement on the basic principles of disarmament unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. For the first time there is a common understanding about the objective to be reached, and the guide lines which should be followed in working toward it. As a result, we are in a position to move quickly from a general exchange of views to a detailed consideration of measures which will actually stop the competition in armaments and bring about substantial reductions from present levels. In my opinion, the problem of stopping the development of more deadly weapons is perhaps more important than that of bringing about measures of disarmament, although of course both problems are of vital importance.

Secondly, the new negotiating committee is representative of all major geographical areas of the world. This reflects the fact that disarmament is not the concern of the great Powers alone, but of all countries, however large or small. The presence at this table of the representatives of eight additional countries is, in my opinion, a major advantage. They will, I am sure, play a valuable role in avoiding the stalemates which have so often developed in past disarmament conferences. Also, the fresh perspective which they bring to the negotiations will assist materially in the search for early agreement. And may I suggest that the presence of these eight other nations has already been of deep significance as well as of great help to the opening phases of this Conference.

Thirdly, we had just ten days ago the unanimous finding of the United Nations Committee on the economic and social consequences of disarmament that general disarmament, far from producing adverse economic effects, would be an immense contribution to the advancement of human wellbeing. There can surely be no doubt that the re-allocation of even part of the enormous resources now devoted to expenditure on armaments would open up unlimited possibilities for the improvement of living standards in all nations, whatever their social system or stage of development.

Fourthly, past experience has made us fully aware of the grave consequences which will follow if we permit these negotiations to fail or even to lose momentum. It is now almost two years since the work of the Ten Nation Committee was broken off. This period has been marked by renewed international tension and a nuclear arms race of increased intensity, of which the resumption of nuclear testing is the most sorious aspect. An even more serious deterioration in the international situation will result if our efforts here cannot bring about rapid agreement.

Finally, the increasingly devastating power of modern weapons has placed a new responsibility on the representatives who are gathered here. The very fact that all of us around this table fully recognize the immeasurable catastrophe which would result from a conflict involving such weapons in itself provides new motives for meeting the challenge which faces us. In my opinion we cannot allow another failure to establish an effective system of disarmament. If we do not succeed on this occasion, the world may not be given another chance.

As far as my delegation is concerned, we have come to Geneva with the firm intention to continue working without interruption until a comprehensive system of general disarmament has been agreed. At the same time we hope and expect to see initial agreements reached with the least possible delay. This Committee is obliged to report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by 1 June, and the peoples of the world will expect a substantial measure of progress by then. The time factor is of vital significance in our work, and we should at once start to search for common ground. This is a case where, as we say in Canada, time is of the essence.

The agreed statement of principles forms the basis for discussion and negotiation at this Conference. It follows that all measures of discrement must be carefully phased and in balance with one another; that no proposal should give one side a substantial military advantage over the other; and that reductions of national armaments must be accompanied by improved international arrangements for maintaining peace and security.

Two principal documents are available to the Committee. There is the programme of disarmament put forward by the United States on 25 September 1961 (ENDC/6). Canada participated in the drafting of this plan, and fully supports it.

The United States representative has emphasized that these proposals have been put forward in a spirit of flexibility and compromise. That is a point to which Canada attaches great importance. In other words, these proposals are not put

forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is also the draft treaty (ENDC/2) advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet plan of 23 September 1960.

These two documents are the result of a long period of study. This is not to say, however, that either of them represents the only solution to this disarmament problem. The eight new members of the Committee will undoubtedly make suggestions of their own. Their views should provide a further valuable contribution to the solution of the problems before us, and they will receive very careful study by my delegation.

In considering the two plans which are now before us we should first seek out common elements on which there is a chance of early agreement. The United States proposals are presented in the form of a "programme" and the Soviet proposals in the language of a "draft treaty". But this is largely a difference of presentation; the substantive provisions contained in the two documents parallel one another in several respects, and I suggest that we should take full advantage of this fact in trying to define and enlarge the area of agreement between the two sides.

Starting from the joint statement of principles we should search out specific problems on which the two sides are close to agreement, and try to settle these as quickly as possible. Having achieved this, we should then go on to study problems on which the two sides are further apart — first to clarify differences and then to resolve them. In this way, my delegation believes, we can systematically move toward a comprehensive system of disarmament and complete the fulfilment of the tasks which have been given us.

I have suggested that we should begin our work with an examination of areas in which rapid agreement might be achieved. There are several examples which could be cited. The following list will help to illustrate the approach which my delegation has in mind.

The first example: The United States and Soviet proposals both provide for means of ensuring that rockets and satellites placed in orbit or launched into outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only. Provision is also made for advance notification to an international disarmament organization about all such launchings. Both sides have an overriding interest in reaching an understanding which will ensure that scientific advances in this field serve only the cause of peace. There

is therefore every reason why agreement should be reached in short order. And may I point out that just this morning we read in the newspapers a report of a United States offer to the Soviet Union of a joint space plan. All of this indicates that it should be fairly easy to reach agreement on this particular subject.

The second example: The United States proposals contain suggestions for observation posts and other procedures designed to reduce the risk of surprize attack or accidental war. Specific proposals to this effect do not appear in the new Soviet draft Treaty, but similar ideas were advanced in the Soviet plan of 23 September 1960 and again in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations on 26 September 1961. The fear that war could break out through accident or miscalculation is a continuing source of international tension which increases as more and more dangerous weapons are developed. Both sides have a vital interest in removing these fears as soon as possible. Both sides have proposed measures which would provide means of doing so. Further negotiation, and a willingness to compromise, could produce agreement in this field.

The third example: The United States plan calls for technical studies of means to deal with chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Soviet Union has also put forward a suggestion for joint studies in this area in its plan of 23 September 1960. In the opinion of my delegation, such technical studies should begin immediately. On the basis of existing proposals it would appear that full agreement already exists on this point and that there is no reason for further debate before concrete action is taken.

The fourth example: Provision is made in both plans — although at different stages — to cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and to transfer existing stocks to peaceful uses. The increased amount of the initial reductions proposed by the United States representative here on 15 March means that by the time the second stage is completed stockpiles will have been very greatly reduced. This fact brings the United States position much closer to the Soviet view that all such stockpiles should be eliminated in stage II. In our opinion, further negotiation could bring about full agreement.

The fifth example: Both plans contain proposals designed to prohibit the wider spread of nuclear weapons. A resolution submitted by Ireland calling for international agreement in this field was endorsed by all the Members of the United Nations at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, just a few months ago. What is required now is early action to bring this recommendation into force.

The sixth example: The United States programme and the Soviet draft treaty both call for reductions of conventional arms in the first stage. The Soviet plan provides for reductions proportionate to manpower cuts. At our second meeting the representative of the United States put forward new proposals calling for a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military Powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences.

My seventh example is as follows: In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new United States proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation, should bring the two major military Powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field.

In these seven areas, and there are probably others, we believe that an appreciable measure of common ground already exists. There is a second category of problems in which there remain more pronounced and generally well-known differences between the two sides. I shall not dwell on them today, with the exception of the vital issue of stopping nuclear weapon tests, which requires special mention.

Canada deeply regretted that last August the Soviet Union broke a three-year moratorium on testing, for we are opposed to all nuclear weapon tests. In this we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear Powers themselves have stated at this very Conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement Is there, then, no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action could bring? Is it not possible, within the framework of this Committee, to make the further effort which is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this Conference itself could be seriously threatened. We already see, in despatch after despatch, stories that this Disarmament Conference is doomed to failure. stories are based on the talks on nuclear weapon tests which have taken place between the three nuclear Powers and in which the other representatives at this Conference have not been involved at all. In the minds of the public the impression has been

created, because of the disagreement in these nuclear test talks, that this Conference is going to be a failure. This, I submit, is a very bad situation and one which I hope will be clarified by the correspondents of all our countries. As a start, it would be most helpful to receive a report on these informal talks which have been taking place on this subject from the three participants. Countries which do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests. However, we can and do appeal to the nuclear States to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed.

There is a third category of problems in which the extent and the nature of the disagreement between the two sides are far from clear. As representatives will have noticed, I referred earlier to cases where there is disagreement but where that disagreement is clear-cut and everyone understands what it is. What is required to resolve this third category of differences is, in the first instance, an intensive discussion which will demonstrate precisely what the positions of the two sides are. We must find out exactly the position taken by the two sides. To avoid continued misunderstanding, the respective interests of the two sides should be brought into the light of day and the possibility of an accommodation of views examined in good faith.

One of the most fundamental problems requiring this kind of examination is the question of verification. Canada's willingness to contribute to a verified system of disarmament has been demonstrated by the offer which my Government has made, and which still stands, to throw open its northern areas for inspection in exchange for comparable rights in corresponding areas of Soviet territory.

In the opinion of my delegation, the best way to achieve a realistic solution of the problem of verification is to avoid any further discussion in the abstract. In other words, we should avoid abstract debates on the word "verification". Instead, there should be careful examination of each measure of disarmament together with the specific verification procedures to ensure that all States carry out that particular disarmament measure. In other words, let us take a measure of disarmament and with it study the verification needed for that measure, rather than studying verification in general.

Let us take an example from the Soviet draft Treaty to illustrate my point.

Article 5 provides for the elimination of certain means of delivering nuclear weapons and for the cessation of their production. Paragraph 3 of this article

provides that the implementation of these measures should be verified by inspectors of the international disarmament organization.

The language of the Soviet draft Treaty suggests that substantial inspection over this measure of disarmament would be allowed. What we need to clarify is how much the inspectors are to be allowed to see and the conditions under which they would carry out this work. Having obtained that clarification, the Committee would then be able to judge how adequate the inspection arrangements would be for verifying the execution of this particular measure.

In pursuing an examination of the problem of inspection, particularly in the area of disarmament which I have just mentioned, the application of sampling techniques as suggested by the United States representative should facilitate agreement. This approach ought to go a long way towards removing fears that inspection will be out of balance with disarmament or be used for any illegitimate purpose. We sincerely believe there is great hope of reaching an agreement on the question of verification through some type of sampling procedure.

The same method of careful, painstaking examination, rather than abstract debate, should be applied in other areas where important but ill-defined differences appear to exist between the two sides.

Finally, I should like to make some proposals concerning procedure. Ever since the break-down of the Ten-Nation Committee nearly two years ago, Canada has been convinced that rapid progress in disarmament negotiations would require a more efficient procedure than has been adopted in the past. In particular, we believe that agreement on effective procedural arrangements is a matter of the first importance if a Committee of this size, with seventeen or eighteen nations participating, is to operate effectively.

The immediate question is how to proceed from the present exchange of general views on disarmament to a detailed examination of the specific problems. In the opinion of my delegation an effective working procedure would be as follows. First, an informal committee of the whole Conference should be established on a continuing basis, with the number attending from each delegation being more limited than at plenary meetings. Second, the co-Chairmen should be given the responsibility for presiding over this committee on alternative days. They should maintain close consultation with one another on the order of business. The plan we are following now in plenary meetings of having rotating chairmen is very good, — although I know

from personal experience that it is more or less an honorary position and puts one in the category of being king for a day. But we believe that for the informal committee it would be much wiser to have the co-Chairmen in the Chair on alternative days. Third, the emphasis in the committee should be on an informal and private method of work. There need be no list of speakers and no verbatim records should be kept. A summary record could be provided for the information of delegations.

The main purpose of this informal working committee would be threefold: first, to follow up as a matter of priority the common elements in the two plans, such as the seven points which I mentioned earlier; second, to try to achieve reasonable compromises in remaining areas where clear differences between the two sides persist; and third, to make more precise the points under dispute in areas where differences between the two sides are yet ill-defined.

In suggesting this procedure, my delegation has had in mind the experience of the Conference here in Geneva on the future of Laos. Although there are continuing difficulties in the field in that unhappy country, the work of the Conference here in Geneva has been successful. This has been due in large measure to the fact that an effective procedure was adopted, a procedure similar to the one I am now suggesting for the Disarmament Conference. At our meeting on Friday, the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, also referred to the experience of the Laos Conference -- of course, India, like Canada, is participating in that Conference -- and he asked in this context that the Committee meet informally so that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union might provide clarification of their respective ideas. We support this idea and agree with this proposal, but what we have in mind in addition is to use the proposed informal committee not only for the purpose of seeking information, but more importantly as a continuing forum for negotiation. . By inviting the guidance of the co-Chairmen we recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union have by far the greatest responsibility in the field of disarmament. I do not suppose that either one of these great nations ever sought this position of prominance or leadership in the world, but they are both in that position and they are essentially the two which It is essential that they work closely together to reach an accommodation of views.

In conclusion, while the problems of disarmament are difficult, there is clearly evident in this Committee a will to achieve results and, more important, a realization of the sobering responsibility we bear for the survival of civilization. The consequences of failure are too disastrous to contemplate. I am confident that we will justify the faith and the trust which mankind has placed in us. From all over the world today, the eyes and the thoughts of peoples are focussed on this Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): There are no further speakers for today, but I do have some announcements to make.

In accordance with the decision of the Committee last Friday, the permanent co-Chairmen have exchanged views and they believe that it would be valuable to have a general informal exchange of views while the Foreign Ministers are here. They suggest that there should be an informal meeting of those delegations which care to participate, three members to a delegation, this afternoon at four o'clock. The holding of further informal meetings should be decided on a day-to-day basis.

If this suggestion is acceptable, today's informal meeting will take place at 4 o'clock in conference room III.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fourth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. K. Yifru, Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Ethiopia.

"The representatives of Bulgaria and Canada made statements.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 20 March 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.5 a.m.